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There is no silver bullet to strengthen the tax 
systems of low-income countries. Dramatic 
changes in tax systems and tax collection 
are rare. Successful improvements more 
often involve a great deal of hard and 
steady work, and the gradual construction 
of popular trust and (grudging) support 
for reform. There remains, however, 
space for ‘organising ideas’ that can help 
identify potentially underexplored and 
underexploited opportunities for reform. 
We focus here on a subset of possibilities 
for reform linked by a common unifying 
idea: simplification. Rather than repeating 
the familiar story about the need to increase 
administrative capacity to improve tax 
collection, we focus on simplification to better 
align revenue collection practices with the 
reality of limited tax administration capacity in 
many low-income countries. We are sceptical 
of the value of elaborate procedures (e.g. 
complex criteria for valuing individual 
buildings for property tax purposes), 
so-called best practice (e.g. the introduction 
of the most complex rules to combat transfer 
mispricing), and the latest technology (e.g. 
sophisticated IT systems). In their place, 
we look for practices and procedures that 
are easy to implement and ‘good enough’ in 
terms of revenue collection and equity. 
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Nothing that we suggest here is novel or ground 
breaking. We are not the first people to note the 
disjuncture between formal tax rules originating 
in Western countries and the complex realities 
of tax administration in low-income countries 
(Gordon and Li 2009). But we believe that this is 
a useful perspective for thinking about reform in 
general, and generates some valuable specific 
policy recommendations.
External templates and 
excessive complexity
One of the most striking features of tax systems 
in many low-income countries is the extent to 
which on paper they resemble very closely 
those of wealthier Western countries – and 
particularly those of former colonial powers. This 
has important advantages. But it also means that 
these systems may sometimes be poorly suited 
to the reality of lower-income countries.
The transition to independence in former 
colonies saw broad features of former 
colonial tax policies written into national laws. 
Internationally-supported tax reform efforts in 
the 1980s and 1990s saw domestic tax laws 
and tax administration increasingly coalesce 
around what has been dubbed a ‘global tax 
reform agenda’, modelled on tax systems in the 
West (Fjeldstad and Moore 2008). Meanwhile, 
international tax rules have been set almost 
entirely by OECD countries.
In some respects this global convergence has 
been welcome. The global tax reform agenda in 
the 1980s and 1990s had much to recommend 
it. Total revenue collection has consistently 
increased in most low-income countries. 
Administrative capacity, likewise, seems to have 
improved. There is little support for a wholesale 
rejection of that reform agenda. However, the 
particular history of tax reform in Africa points 
towards one obvious possibility: rules premised 
on the economic formality and administrative 
capacity of Western countries may prove 
excessively complex and difficult to implement in 
the more informal lower-capacity environment of 
low-income countries. 
The case for simplification
Tax policies and administrative practices 
adopted from the West were designed to 
maximise revenue and economic efficiency in the 
context of largely formal economic transactions 
and strong administrative capacity. However, 
those same policies may yield much lower 
revenue – or create significant inequities and 
distortions – in more informal environments, and 
where tax enforcement is highly imperfect. 
There is a trade-off between theoretical efficiency 
and what we might call ‘implementability’. In 
some cases the best policy option may not be 
that which in theory maximises efficiency, but that 
which strikes the best balance between efficiency 
and ‘implementability’. Elsewhere some such 
policies have been referred to as second-best, or 
even third-best, options (Kleven et al. 2016).
Simplified approaches may have both technical 
and political benefits. It can be difficult to attribute 
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systems are complex. Is underperformance the 
result of a lack of implementation capacity? Of 
inadequate systems or policy? Or the absence of 
high-level political commitment to making reform 
successful? Insufficient capacity can become 
a convenient scapegoat for poor performance. 
This ambiguity is reduced with simplified systems 
because the drivers of poor performance, whether 
technical or political, are easier to identify.
Historically tax simplification efforts have focused 
in particular on subnational tax systems and 
the local taxation of small enterprises, with 
an emphasis on abolishing ‘nuisance taxes’, 
excessively complex administrative practices, 
and complicated principles and systems for 
granting tax exemptions. The main aims have 
been to reduce informality, corruption and high 
compliance costs. The more complex systems 
appear inefficient both on paper and in practice. 
Building on these examples, we propose that 
the simplification principle may have broader 
value, including in areas in which longstanding 
approaches appear efficient on paper but work 
poorly in practice. We are talking therefore of a 
departure from the orthodox wisdom of many tax 
specialists.
Potential reform targets
We identify five potential applications of the logic 
set out above. We are not suggesting that these 
proposals are universally applicable or easily 
achieved. Rather, they deserve to be placed 
more centrally on the menu of possible reform 
options for a wide variety of low-income contexts.
1) Simplify data management and IT systems
The introduction of sophisticated new IT systems 
has been a central feature of tax reform efforts 
in recent decades. They have the potential to 
dramatically improve the management of data, 
internal data sharing, control of corruption and 
human resource management. However, in 
practice the introduction of new IT systems has 
frequently been relatively unsuccessful. Even in 
the more successful cases, IT systems appear 
to be used far below their potential. This points 
to the likely value of focusing on simplifiying 
data systems, and implementing streamlined IT 
systems designed to perform essential functions 
in ways consistent with local capacity.
The most telling illustration lies in the realm of 
data sharing, which is the foundation of effective 
tax enforcement. Comparing data from different 
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sources allows tax agencies to identify under-
declaration of tax liabilities by taxpayers. This data 
may come from within tax administrations (e.g. 
comparing data from income taxes, VAT, customs, 
property), from across government (e.g. business 
registration, property records, motor vehicles, 
business registration) or from non-government 
sources (e.g. bank accounts, utility bills, stock 
exchange transactions, credit cards).
Facilitating and automating such data sharing 
is among the basic purposes of most new 
IT systems. Yet much less data is shared in 
this way than one would expect in the tax 
administrations of many low-income countries. 
In many cases there is not even effective data 
sharing across departments within the same tax 
administration. Data sharing among government 
agencies is still less common, while access 
to third-party data is very limited, owing to a 
combination of administrative weakness and 
policy barriers. 
Recent experience suggests that the solution 
is unlikely to lie in still greater investment in 
sophisticated IT systems. Significant data 
sharing can, in principle, be achieved with 
the most rudimentary IT systems – and, if the 
focus is on a subset of the largest taxpayers, 
who typically account for a high proportion of 
revenue collected, data matching using basic 
spreadsheets may be adequate to make initial 
progress (Kangave et al. 2016, 2018). A better 
reform strategy may thus be to focus first on 
putting basic strategies for improving data 
sharing in place, and then invest in comparatively 
simple IT systems once data sharing has 
become an accepted routine.
2) Tax revenue rather than profits
It is one of the central principles of contemporary 
taxation that taxes on corporations should as far 
as possible be levied on their profits rather than 
turnover. There are straightforward reasons. 
Not only does this seem fair, but the more that 
companies are taxed on turnover, the more likely 
it is they will be obliged to pay taxes even when 
their profits are low or they are making losses. 
This will lead to a reduction in overall levels 
of investment and economic activity, leaving 
everyone worse off. 
There are, however, potential social costs to an 
exclusive reliance on taxing profits. Companies 
can seek to reduce the profits that they declare 
for tax purposes, either by artificially reducing 
declared revenue or artificially inflating declared 
costs. This can be achieved by manipulating 
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transactions – for example, when trading with 
a family member or friend who may be less 
likely to attract the attention of tax authorities. 
More often it is achieved through international 
transfer mispricing – shifting actual profits to 
related companies elsewhere in the world, by 
over-valuing imported products and services and 
under-valuing exports. The advantage of a tax 
of turnover, relative to a tax on profits, is that it 
reduces the evasion options available to firms. 
Whereas profits can be artificially reduced either 
by reducing revenue or inflating costs, turnover 
taxes are easier to enforce because they are not 
affected by declared costs, and are thus only 
vulnerable to efforts to artificially reduce revenue.
Where tax enforcement capacity is weak, as in 
many low-income countries, reliance on taxes 
on profit rather than turnover may create a 
situation in which the societal costs of revenue 
lost through tax evasion outweigh the benefits 
in economic efficiency. This is the conclusion 
of a recent empirical study from Pakistan. This 
provides evidence that, where declared profits 
are low, relying on turnover-based taxes can 
reduce evasion by almost 70 per cent without 
reducing economic efficiency (Best et al. 2015). 
Alternative minimum taxes may be desirable in 
such cases – if assessed profits are less than a 
certain proportion of assessed turnover (say 1 
per cent), then taxpayers are required to pay 1 
per cent of turnover rather than a profit tax. 
Measures like alternative minimum taxes may 
be applied universally, or confined to particular 
economic sectors in which it is easy for 
companies to engage in avoidance and evasion, 
like telecoms and mining (Durst 2016). These 
options are not without problems. But, while they 
offend against what is theoretically best, they 
may be very well-suited to the reality of many 
low-income countries.
3) Simplify systems of property taxation
The laws governing property taxes in many 
low-income countries are inherited from the 
colonial period, when typically only a tiny minority 
of (urban) properties were liable for the tax. This 
has resulted in overly-complex valuation systems, 
often made worse by fragmented institutional 
arrangements and inter-agency rivalry. 
Existing property tax systems are generally 
based on sending professional property valuers 
to estimate the market or rental value of every 
property. This is very challenging. There are few 
skilled valuers, and their services are expensive 
relative to property tax yields. The task is 
technically difficult and time-consuming, owing to 
weakness in public information systems on land 
title and property value, and the unwillingness 
of land and property tax departments to share 
information with one another. The result has 
been incomplete and out-of-date property 
valuations, inequity across properties, significant 
opportunities for corruption, and mistrust among 
taxpayers rooted in a lack of transparency and 
legal clarity.
Recent experience indicates a relatively 
straightforward template for improvement: 
(a) simplify property valuation through the use of 
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methods that rely on easily observable features 
of properties, combined in simple formulas, 
to estimate market value; (b) decentralise 
responsibility for data collection and property 
valuation – perhaps still under the oversight of 
central valuation officers – in order to facilitate 
the hiring and training of human resources; 
and (c) where necessary, simplify and clarify 
institutional responsibility for property valuation 
and tax collection to ensure strong incentives for 
effective collection. 
4) Push for simplified international tax 
rules
Existing international rules governing the 
cross-border taxation of transnational firms 
(TNCs) and wealthy individuals were created 
through international institutions that are 
dominated by today’s OECD countries. These 
have, in turn, continued be the leading voices 
in shaping more recent reform. Enforcement of 
these rules requires comparatively high levels 
of administrative capacity, and even OECD 
countries often struggle to enforce the rules 
effectively. Unsurprisingly, the rules tend to work 
significantly less well in low-income countries. 
A potentially powerful lens for thinking about 
reform thus lies in attempting to simplify existing 
rules, to better align them with the economic and 
administrative reality in low-income countries.
The most dramatic proposal for this simplification 
is a move towards formulary apportionment, or 
unitary taxation. This would eliminate reliance 
on complex rules for allocating profits across 
subsidiaries of TNCs – which has facilitated 
shifting of profits into tax havens – in favour of 
simply dividing the global profits of a TNC across 
countries using a simple formula. However, such 
a solution appears politically very complicated 
owing to the challenge of agreeing common 
formulas, and seems unlikely to become law in 
the short term. It is, however, rooted in part in the 
logic of simplification, to better match policy to 
administrative reality in lower-income countries.
More immediately, we can imagine what more 
incremental simplifying reform might look like in 
two broad domains:
• Transfer pricing. Existing transfer pricing 
rules, based on the arms-length principle, 
are frequently too administratively complex 
to be enforced effectively in low-income 
countries. However, individual countries 
have selectively adopted simplified methods 
designed specifically to overcome capacity 
constraints. Brazil, for example, applies 
pre-defined profit margins to the subsidiaries 
of multinational firms in order to avoid the 
administrative complexity of evaluating transfer 
prices for individual transactions. Mexico and 
the Dominican Republic have sought, albeit in 
slightly less explicit ways, to arrive at simplified 
and standardised profit margins within specific 
sectors using a combination of safe harbour 
and advance pricing agreements. Despite 
opposition from the OECD, recent experience 
suggests simplified alternative methods could 
be beneficial in practice for countries with limited 
enforcement capacity – while such rules are in 










Tax reform for low-income countries: five ideas for simplifying tax systems to fit local realities
rules, and with historical approaches to taxing 
multinational firms (Picciotto forthcoming).
• Data exchange. Recent reforms include new 
processes for the automatic exchange of 
information among national tax administrations 
for tax purposes. This is in principle a major 
step forward, replacing past reliance on bilateral 
information exchange made in response to 
specific detailed requests. However, challenges 
remain. Participation by low-income countries 
will depend on their putting in place relatively 
complex systems and data protection in order 
to access relevant data. Simplifying reform 
might focus on less demanding rules and 
systems for accessing and transmitting the 
data (at least for low-income countries), while 
working to make some data publicly available 
(like country-by-country reports and beneficial 
ownership registries).
5) Simplify through regional tax 
cooperation
Finally, effective tax enforcement is made more 
challenging by differences – both large and 
small – between tax systems in neighbouring 
countries. These differences can prevent useful 
cooperation, result in duplication of effort, and 
drive the adoption of complex tax exemptions that 
undermine the broader integrity of tax systems. 
Through greater regional cooperation countries 
could, for example, adopt common rules 
governing transfer pricing and other aspects of 
international taxation. This would reduce the range 
of options available to firms seeking to engage 
in tax avoidance and evasion. The adoption of 
regional strategies for the negotiation of fairer 
tax treaties – and for the renegotiation of those 
that already exist – could serve a similar role. 
Regional customs unions would eliminate a host 
of concerns and challenges related to customs, 
excises and smuggling, while harmonised 
VATs could contribute to easing the challenges 
associated with tax refunds and related fraud. 
Perhaps most importantly, low-income 
countries have long struggled with the effective 
administration of tax incentives and exemptions, 
which tend to be poorly targeted, prone to 
corruption and undermine the quality of tax 
administration. Regional cooperation would at a 
minimum simplify tax administration by reducing 
pressure for the adoption of such exemptions. 
Common regional standards may go further 
in constraining the type of exemptions that 
can be offered. While in theory the latter may 
limit government flexibility in seeking to attract 
investment, in practice all existing evidence 
suggests that simple rules and constraints would 
lead to better and more transparent outcomes.
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